Chad Hansen has advanced some prima facie persuasive arguments that in pre-Qin thought DAO4 refers only to "ways" of living, of acting, or of ordering society, and not to a "metaphysical entity." Thus the concept expressed by the term DAO4 in Laozi and Zhuangzi is the same concept expressed by this term in the Lunyu, Mozi, Mencius, and Xunzi, though of course the authors of these texts may hold different theories about DAO4. (The terminology I am using is my own; Hansen's is somewhat different. For an explanation of his terminology and a sample of his arguments, see his "A Tao of Tao in Chuang-tzu," in Victor Mair, ed., _Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu_, especially pp. 30-33, and his _Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought_, especially pp. 206-208, 215-216, 268-269, and 287.)
As I understand them, some of the reasons for questioning the "metaphysical" reading of DAO4 are these:
1. In texts other than Laozi and Zhuangzi, DAO4 is usually not taken to refer a metaphysical entity. So why should we attribute a radically different meaning to the term in these two texts?
2. Moreover, if DAO4 somehow "evolved" a new meaning in these two texts, it seems odd that it changed back to the old meaning in the Xunzi, a later text, without the authors of the Xunzi remarking on this point.
3. Many of the uses of the term in Laozi and Zhuangzi (particularly in the Qiwulun) do not support a "metaphysical" reading at all. Consider, for example, the line "dao xing zhi er cheng," translated by Watson (p. 40) as "a road is made by people walking on it," but in the context more appropriately translated "a dao is formed by [someone's] practicing it" or "a way [of doing something] is formed by [someone's] proceeding according to it." If this line is translated "The Great Metaphysical Way of the Cosmos is formed by our following it," it sounds odd and almost self-contradictory.
4. Benjamin Schwartz: "How does a term which seems to refer in Confucianism mainly to social and natural order come to refer to a mystic reality?" (World of Thought, p. 194)
How indeed? Suppose we were philosophical opponents of Confucianism concerned to deny the Confucian view of life and assert a fresh vision of mystic reality and its implications for human life. Wouldn't we want to choose a distinctive name for the central concept of our philosophy? Why would we choose a term that was already being used by our opponents to express a very different meaning? I submit that, as rhetorically competent philosophers, we would not want to choose the unmodified noun DAO4. If we did use the word DAO4, we would want to modify it, e.g, TIANDAO4; but all in all, we'd be better off using some other term, such as TIANLI3 (pattern of heaven).
5. The primary author of the Zhuangzi Nei Pian seems to have understood himself to be participating in an ongoing philosophical discourse with the Ruists and the Mohists. If so, why would he suddenly change the meaning of an important philosophical term common to representative texts of both of these schools? Wouldn't this just confuse the issues he wished to discuss?
6. If the authors of the Laozi and Zhuangzi intended to bestow a new meaning on the term DAO4, why didn't they say so explicitly? The Laozi is a piecemeal text, so for the moment let's restrict this point to the Zhuangzi, which contains many longer, coherent passages. If the author of the Nei Pian intended to use the word DAO4 in a way unlike that of his philosophical predecessors and contemporaries, why didn't he explain this new use of the term in the text? By contrast, at the end of the Dechungfu chapter, he uses the word QING2 in an unusual way but then immediately explains what he means by it.
Christopher Fraser
Date created: 10/28/96 Last modified: 10/28/96 Questions? Contact: Stephen C. Angle